Imperfectly enforced emissions standards, under-reporting and general deterrence: empirical evidence.

This provides empirical estimates of the effect that enforcement actions by municipal and national authorities have on the level of both reported and actual emissions of industrial plants. In a regulatory framework where non-complying is ubiquitous and most violations aren´t followed by a sanction, we provide evidence consistent with under-reporting and general deterrence of BOD discharges by industrial plants. Previous empirical analyses in environmental enforcement, mostly in developed countries and without information on both reported and actual levels of emissions, either did not deal with the issue of under-reporting or were not able to find such evidence.
  • Imperfectly enforced emissions standards, under-reporting and general deterrence: empirical evidence.
  • 2017-08-18T09:00:00-03:00
  • 2017-08-18T10:00:00-03:00
  • This provides empirical estimates of the effect that enforcement actions by municipal and national authorities have on the level of both reported and actual emissions of industrial plants. In a regulatory framework where non-complying is ubiquitous and most violations aren´t followed by a sanction, we provide evidence consistent with under-reporting and general deterrence of BOD discharges by industrial plants. Previous empirical analyses in environmental enforcement, mostly in developed countries and without information on both reported and actual levels of emissions, either did not deal with the issue of under-reporting or were not able to find such evidence.
  • Cuándo 18/08/2017 de 09:00 a 10:00 (America/Montevideo / UTC-300)
  • Dónde PIso 14 CMAT
  • Nombre
  • Speaker Marcelo Caffera
  • Agregar evento al calendario iCal

(Es un trabajo en conjunto con Alejandro Lagomarsino).